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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction in this matter is proper through Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, Title II, Rules 3 and 4 as an appeal from a final order and judgment of a 
District Court. All notice provisions have been complied with, and the required 
fees have been paid. The appeal was properly docketed with the District Court 
within 30 days after the date of the final order or judgment appealed from, and is 
now, by rule, before this Court. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE ON APPEAL 
AND 
STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
I DID THE DISTRICT COURT ERR IN FAILING TO AWARD ALL 
COSTS OF COLLECTION AFTER A CIVIL ACTION IS FILED AS 
PROVIDED BY THE UTAH BAD CHECK LAW, U.C.A. 7-15-1 BY 
FOLLOWING A MEMORANDUM, THE CREATION OF WHICH 
WAS ARBITRARY AND BEYOND THE DISCRETION OF THE 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGES? 
5 
The issue of the meaning of "all costs of collection" is a matter of statutory 
construction which is reviewed for correctness. Price v. Armor. 949 P.2d 1251, 
(Utah 1997), Visitor Information Center of Grand County v. Customer Tax 
Division, Utah State Tax Division, 930 P.2d 1196, 1198, (Utah 1997). 
The standard of review of whether the Judges' creation of and reliance on the 
memorandum was proper is abuse of discretion. Constitution of Utah, Article V, 
Section 1; Article VI, Section 1, subsections 1 and 2. 
The issue was preserved at oral argument by Judge Fratto's specific language 
that "the thing needs to be looked at more closely and a final determination made in 
terms of trying to unify . . . varied interpretations."1 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTE 
AND 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
U.C.A. 7-15-1. The statute is lengthy and is set forth in its entirety in the 
addendum to the brief 
Constitution of Utah, Article V, Section 1: 
The powers of the government of the State of Utah shall be divided 
!
 Hearing Transcript, pg. 8, lines 19-22. 
6 
into three distinct departments, the Legislative, the Executive, and the 
Judicial; and no person charged with the exercise of powers belonging 
to one of these departments, shall exercise any functions appertaining 
to either of the others, except in the cases herein expressly directed or 
permitted. 
Article VI Section 1: 
The legislative power of the state shall be vested: L In a Senate 
and House of Representatives which shall be designated the Legislature 
of the State of Utah. 2. In the people of the State of Utah, as 
hereinafter stated: The legal voters or such fractional part thereof of the 
State of Utah as may be provided by law, may initiate any desired 
legislation and cause the same to be submitted to a vote of the people 
for approval or rejection, or may require any law passed by the 
Legislature (except those laws passed by a two-thirds vote of the 
members elected to each house of the Legislature) to be submitted to 
the voters of the State before such law shall take effect. 
The legal voters or such fractional part thereof as may be 
provided by law, of any legal subdivision of the State, under such 
conditions and such manner and within such time as may be provided 
by law. may initiate any desired legislation and cause the same to be 
submitted to a vote of the people of said legal subdivision for approval 
or rejection, or may require any law or ordinance passed by the law 
making body of said legal subdivision to be submitted to the voters 
thereof before such law or ordinance shall take effect 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case is before the Court to determine what is meant by "all costs of 
collection" as addressed by U.C.A. 7-15-1(4-7), (sometimes referred to hereinafter 
as the Utah Bad Check Law). On January 10, 2000, six Judges on the bench of the 
7 
Third District Court signed a joint memorandum titled "Policy For Default Judgment 
Awards for Dishonored Checks/5 (hereinafter "The Memorandum"). The 
Memorandum listed the awards the Courts would make under U.C.A. 7-15-1 in the8 
West Valley, Murray, and Sandy Departments of the Third District Court. A copy 
of the Memorandum is included in the addendum to this brief as Exhibit 1. 
In the instant case, Plaintiff/Appellant (hereinafter "Checkrite") sued for 
recovery of several checks written by Defendant/Appellee (hereinafter King). Upon 
proper service of the summons and complaint, and after the time to file an answer 
had passed, a motion for default judgment was made. All statutory notice 
requirements were met, and are not at issue here. Checkrite submitted a proposed 
judgment in the amount of $1,386.88, which included $180.72 in collection costs for 
nine checks at $20.08 per check. Those costs are what would have been paid to 
Checkrite as its fees for recovery services. 
Judge Burton of the District Court, Murray Department, rejected part of the 
proposed default judgment by delineation and in his own handwriting stated " 
'Collection costs' not allowable on checks written after May, 1999/52 That decision 
was based on the Memorandum referred to above. Checkrite requested oral hearing 
2
 A copy of that default judgment. the Notice of Hearing on Collection 
Cost, and the Default Rejection Notice are included in the Addendum as Exhibit 2. 
8 
on ilk" issues ol allowable » olkvlion * .» T; Ilt\inin w .r. hrhl on November 29, 
2000 before Ji idge Joseph C I ; i atto also of the Murray Division. A transcript of 
ihi: hearing is included in the addendum to this brief as Exhibit 3, and w ill be referred 
to hereinafter as "Hearing 1 ranscript"3 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
During the hearing Judge Fratto stated in open court that unless a compelling 
argument existed for going against the language oi tne memorandum lit \\ uiih t 
disregard the pohev, and subsequtiilk domul Ilk uilkvlinns rosls ol % I SO 71,4 
This is llie basis of lliis appeal 
The refe\aiil statute, 1 I (' \ 7- 15 1 delineates the types of costs recoverable. 
In general,, the recoverable items increase with the time elapsed before the writer of 
the bad check makes good the check, or is sued;5 
The basic statutory scheme is as follows: 
3
 A copy of the complaint and all evidentiary docun lentation which 
accompanied the complaint and upon which the default judgment was based. an^u, 
with all documents and orders subsequently filed is included as Exhibit 3 in the 
addendum to this brief The pages have been numbered sequentially, beginning 
w ith the complaint. 
4
 Hearing Transcript, page 5, lines 14 - 18. 
5
 U.CA 7 1 15, as required, is included in the addendum. 
9 
During the first 15 days after the notice of the dishonored check, the holder of 
the check or his agent may demand the amount of the check plus a $20.00 statutory 
service charge.6 
1. After 15 days, and up to 30 days after notice, the holder or his agent 
may demand the amount of the check, the $20 service charge, and 
collection costs not exceeding $20.00, for a total recoverable sum of 
the check amount plus up to $40.00.7 
2. After 30 days, the holder or his agent may offer to not file a civil action, 
and may demand the statutory service charge, collection costs not 
exceeding $20.00. and the greater of $50.00 or triple the check amount, 
which amount may not exceed the check amount plus $250,00; and if 
the holder or his agent 8retains an attorney, reasonable attorney's fees 
not to exceed $50.00, 
* U.C.A.7-15-l-(2)(b). 
" Id, §(4). 
* Id, §(6)(a). 
10 
3, 11 Ilk' holder decides to sue, and prevails, he may recover the check 
amount; interest; all costs of collection, including all court costs a? id 
reasonable attorney 'sfees; and damages equal to the greater of 
$100 00, or triple the check amount and not to exceed the chedv 
amount plus $500,00" "", 
Kir example, I loldei, who has <i bad elieik iron l Maker ii I tl le ai noi it it of 
$S0 00, gives (lie ehei k lo , u^uil lw u \w\\ \ I Ipon pi opei i lotice ai id den land, 
]\lal-i " dni>; noi \\\\ 1 inn ihc (HMI ihinu^h fifteenth da>, Holder demands $50.00 
ph is tl le $20.00 service charge, some of which nun PO lo Agent, tor a toiui -~ 
,p / w.ivo, but Maker refuses pay. 
From day fifteen to day thirty, Holder or Agent demands $50 00, the $20.00 
service charge, and collection costs not exceeding $20,00, for a total of up to 
$90.00. Still Maker does not pay. 
After day thirty, Holder oi Agent has llu1 opimn of ollerim' lo rolled $^0 00, 
the $20 00 sen ice dunvy col ledum costs not exceeding $70 00, $1 SO 00 (triple the 
9
 Id, §(7)(b)(iii) 
10
 At this step, the $20,00 available as the M.UU5OI \ >cr\ u.c diai -L ^
 :. - -^ 
The statute opens up to "all costs of collection" to retleet the additional costs 
incurred to prepare for filing a civil suit, i.e. skip tracing, employment verification, 
accounting,, and preparing and sending the ease to an attorney. 
11 
check amount,)11 and if he retains an attorney, attorney's fees not exceeding $50.00, 
for a total recoverable amount of up to $290.00. Maker refuses the offer. 
Holder, through his agent, is then left with the final recourse of filing a civil 
action. Upon prevailing he may recover the check amount, ($50.00), interest, and 
"all costs of collection, including all court costs and reasonable attorney's fees", 
and $150.00 (triple the check amount). The total recoverable amount would depend 
on the total amount of "all costs of collection, including all court costs and 
reasonable attorneys' fees." u 
In summary, the statute allows for escalation in costs, including collection 
costs, as time elapses without payment of the check The Third District Court 
Judges have eliminated the recovery of collection costs in a civil action at the point 
when the greatest costs have been incurred. This is the crux of this appeal 
11
 At this point, the statute requires that the treble damages go to Holder, not 
to Agent. Agent's only possible compensation consists of his collection costs, 
and such part of the statutory services as he and Holder have contracted for. 
12
 After civil suit, the statutory service fee is gone, and the treble damages 
must be paid to Holder. Agent's only compensation is the recoupment of his 
collection costs, as addressed by "all costs of collection. . ." 
12 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
"All costs of collection is not limited to court costs and attorney's fees. The 
meaning and intent of "all costs of collection" as used in U.C.A. 7-15-l-(7)(b)(iii) 
has already been decided in the Utah Courts. 
The District Court Judges exceeded their constitutional authority in issuing 
and following the January 10, 2000 Memorandum by going against the plain 
language of the statute. Their interpretation of the statute in light of the rules of 
statutory construction is illogical. 
ARGUMENT 
I DID THE DISTRICT COURT ERR IN FAILING TO AWARD ALL 
COSTS OF COLLECTION AFTER A CIVIL ACTION IS FILED AS 
PROVIDED BY THE UTAH BAD CHECK LAW. U.C.A. 7-15-1 BY 
FOLLOWING A MEMORANDUM, THE CREATION OF WHICH WAS 
ARBITRARY AND BEYOND THE DISCRETION OF THE DISTRICT 
COURT JUDGES? 
A. The Utah Courts have already decided the meaning of "all costs of 
collection" as it pertains to the Utah Bad Check Law. In Thoren v. Sandy City and 
Southridge Industrial Park Special Improvement District, 849 P.2d 592, (Utah 
13 
App. 1993), the Court of Appeals cited the language of U.C.A. 7-15-1(3), (the 
previous version of the bad check law) in its discussion of whether attorney fees 
were allowable in that case. In that case, Sandy City contended that attorney fees 
were a cost of collection. The Court of Appeals stated that *c[A]ttorney fees are 
awardable only if authorized by statute or contract. Thoren, 849 P.2d 592, at 596. 
The Court of Appeals' discussion is sufficiently clear and on point as to 
warrant a verbatim recitation here: 
"'In Utah, attorney fees are awardable only if authorized by 
statute or by contract.' Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 
988 (Utah 1988). Moreover, attorney fees should not be confused with 
the more generic term "costs" because without specific statutory 
language, costs do not include attorney fees. Hicks v. Lloyd's General 
Ins Agency, Inc., 763 P,2d 85 (Okl. 1988); Lanes v. O'Brien, 746 
P,2d 1366, 1374 (Colo, App, 1987). This is especially true in light of 
many other instances where the Utah Legislature has expressly 
authorized the award of attorney fees, sometimes explicitly 
distinguishing fees from costs. See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. §7-15-
l(3)(c) (Supp. 1992) (person issuing bad checks is liable for 'all costs 
of collection, including all court costs and reasonable attorney's fees'); 
Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-17 (1988) (subcontractor enforcing mechanics' 
lien shall have costs awarded "including . . . reasonable attorney's 
fee'); Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56(1) (1992) (where action is brought in 
bad faith 'court shall award reasonable attorney's fees to a prevailing 
party')/'13 
13
 Thoren v Sandy City. 849 P.2d 592, 596, (Utah App. 1993). 
14 
The Court of Appeals went on to deny attorney's fees in that case, and in 
footnote 5 of the opinion, further discussed "costs of collection" in the context of 
promissory notes. 
"While we recognize that in the context of promissory notes, 'costs of 
collection,' as a term of art, can be taken to include attorney's fees without so 
stating, see Black's Law Dictionary 312 (5th ed. 1979), such an application is 
inapplicable in the context of statutory interpretation in Utah, especially in light of 
section 7-15-1(3), which demonstrates the Legislature does not have that 
understanding. . . ." 14 
When read in light of Thoren, it is clear that "all costs of collection, including 
all court cost and reasonable attorney's fees" is not intended nor held to limit "all 
costs of collection" to court costs and attorney's fees. The language of the old 
statute which was used by the Court of Appeals in Thoren is identical to the 
language in question in the instant case.15 The Court of Appeals was correct in it's 
determination and analysis in Thoren and the application of that case to this case is 
dispositive of the issue. 
It is important to realize that as a matter of statutory interpretation, costs, or 
costs of collection are different in common law, tort law, etc., than in debt 
collection. In tort law, costs are incidental costs to the litigation, whereas in debt 
14
 Thoren, supra, at 596. footnote 5, 
,:)
 The new statute, which was passed in 1998 and became effective in 1999, 
adopted the same language that the Thoren court interpreted in the prior statute. 
15 
collection, cost of collection are the subject matter. Accordingly, "all costs of 
collection" in the instant case should be interpreted in the context of debt collection. 
Further, the language in question uses the word "including". It is generally 
accepted that "include" or "including" in statutes is meant to extend or enlarge, not 
to limit. 16 Statutes listing types of costs that are specifically allowed or allowed 
under certain conditions do not provide exhaustive lists, but are merely illustrative of 
costs that a court could consider.17 
B. The language of the statute clearly is meant to allow all court costs and 
reasonable attorneys' fees, as well as all costs of collection. For the District Court 
to determine that the language is meant to be exclusive is a clear misreading of the 
plain language of the statute, and is illogical, given the use of almost identical 
language in other parts of the statute. It is also clearly contrary to existing case law. 
Prior sections of the statute specifically allow costs of collections when the 
maker of the check fails to make good on the check with proper demand and 
16
 The word "include", as used in a statute describing items includable as 
costs, is ordinarily used as a word of extension or enlargement. "The use of the 
word 'includes' rather than 'means' in a regulatory definition indicates that what 
follows is a non-exclusive list which may be enlarged upon. Cherry Creek School 
District No. 5 v. Voelker by Voelker, 859 P.2d 805, 813 (Colo. 1993). 
17
 Harvey v Farmer's Ins. Exchange, 983 P.2d 34. rehearing den., cert. 
Granted. (Colo. App. 1998). 
16 
notice.18 All those requirements must be met before a civil action can be filed. In 
this matter, those requirements were met, and are not in dispute in the appeal. 
Nothing in the language of the statute denies those collection costs to those forced 
to litigate. 
If a holders' agent has collection costs available until suit, to deny the agent 
those costs after suit removes the agent from the collection process, thereby-
denying him remuneration for his efforts. It has the effect of allowing the maker of 
the delinquent check to avoid paying his statutory and legal obligations because the 
agent, who handles most of these checks, has lost his incentive to sue. 
In the normal course of business, a holder or his agent will only sue as a last 
resort, and only after a strict statutory conformance. Civil suits are the most 
expensive and the least cost effective method of collecting debts. Hence, the 
statutory scheme allowing "all costs of collection . . ." is designed to provide for 
greater recoverable costs to compensate the agent for the increased expense and 
effort of litigation. 
8
 U.C.A. 7-15-1- (2)(b), (4)(a) and (b), (5)(i)(a) and (b). (6)(a)(i),(ii),(iii). 
17 
Rules of statutory interpretation are resorted to for the purpose of resolving 
an ambiguity, not for the purpose of creating it.19 It is not the prerogative of the 
District Court to rewrite statutes or to question the wisdom, social desirability, or 
public policy underlying it.20 The Memorandum of January 10, 2000, relied upon by 
Judges Burton and Fratto, is clearly a rewriting of the relevant portions of the 
statute in question by the District Court Judges. 
Because the term uall costs of collection, including all court costs and 
reasonable attorney's fees" is identical in the current statute to the language in the 
prior statute, it should be construed to have the same meaning.21 
The Utah Constitution specifically grants all legislative power to the legislative 
branch of the government.22 That power cannot be delegated.23 nor can it be 
19
 Railroad Com. Of Wisconsin v. Chicago, B. & Q. R, Co., 257 U.S. 563, 
66 L Ed 371, 42 S Ct 232; Smith v. State, 99 Miss. 859, 50 So. 179. 
20
 Caminetti v. United States. 242 U.S. 470, 485. 37 S. Ct. 192, 194, 61 
L.Ed. 442(1917). 
21
 Prior statutes relating to the same subject matter are to be compared with 
the new provision, and if possible by reasonable construction, both are to be 
construed so that effect is given to every provision. Murray City v. Hall, 663 P.2d 
1314, (Utah 1983). 
22
 Constitution of Utah, Article V, Section 1; Article VI, Sections 1, 
Subsections 1 and 2. 
Article V Section 1: The powers of the government of the State of Utah shall be 
divided into three distinct departments, the Legislative, the Executive, and the 
18 
assumed by another branch of the government.24 Certain powers may be delegated 
to agencies when a policy has been prescribed by statute25, but such has not been 
done in the instant case. 
Judicial; and no person charged with the exercise of powers belonging to one of 
these departments, shall exercise any functions appertaining to either of the others, 
except in the cases herein expressly directed or permitted. 
Article VI Section 1: The legislative power of the state shall be vested: 1. In 
a Senate and House of Representatives which shall be designated the Legislature of 
the State of Utah. 2. In the people of the State of Utah, as hereinafter stated: 
The legal voters or such fractional part thereof, of the State of Utah as may 
be provided by law, may initiate any desired legislation and cause the same to be 
submitted to a vote of the people for approval or rejection, or may require any law 
passed by the Legislature (except those laws passed by a two-thirds vote of the 
members elected to each house of the Legislature) to be submitted to the voters of 
the State before such law shall take effect 
The legal voters or such fractional part thereof as may be provided by law, 
of any legal subdivision of the State, under such conditions and such manner and 
within such time as may be provided by law, may initiate any desired legislation and 
cause the same to be submitted to a vote of the people of said legal subdivision for 
approval or rejection, or may require any law or ordinance passed by the 
lawmaking body of said legal subdivision to be submitted to the voters thereof 
before such law or ordinance shall take effect 
23
 The legislative power of the state is by the Constitution vested in the 
legislature, and under circumstances therein specified, in the people of the state, 
and legislative power may not, by the legislature, be delegated to other agencies, 
except where expressly directed or permitted by the Constitution, State v. Gross. 
79 Utah 559, 11 P.2d 340 (1982) 
24
 Constitution of Utah, Article V, Section 1 
25
 State v. Gross, supra. 
19 
Although the Judges were concerned by the need for uniformity26 between the 
courts, to declare sua sponte that uall collection costs" does not mean all 
collection costs, the Judges' actions in this case are clearly arbitrary and beyond 
their constitutional authority. 
It is for the legislature to determine what it's own language means when there 
is unclear language. Again, it is not the court's prerogative to rewrite statutes or to 
question wisdom, social desirability, or public policy underlying it. 
The language of U.C.A. 7-15-1 et seq. is clear and unambiguous, and it 
clearly allows collection costs other than court costs and reasonable attorneys' fees 
to those who must sue for recovery.27 28 
To the best of Checkrite' knowledge the only courts in the State of Utah that 
are following the January 10, 2000 Memorandum policy are the Murray, Sandy and 
26
 Hearing Transcript, page 5, lines 7-100. 
27
 "When language is clear an unambiguous, it must be held to mean what it 
expresses, and no room is left for construction." Visitor Information Center 
Authority of Grand County v Customer Tax Division, Utah State Tax 
Commission, 930 P 2d 1196, 1198, (Utah 1997), 
28
 Included as addendum Exhibit 4 is the "bullet sheet" by Senator John 
Swallow provided to the legislature to explain the plain meaning of the statute. 
Senator Swallow was the principal sponsor of the current version of the Utah Bad 
Check Law. The bullet sheet is not intended to serve as evidence, but simply to 
help explain the legislative history* 
20 
West Valley District Courts. Other Courts in Utah are allowing all costs of 
collection.29 This disparity in interpretation of the statutory meaning must be 
resolved, and this Court is the proper forum. 
The differences in policy in the District Courts call for a resolution. It is 
paramount to realize that the position of the Judges in Murray, Sandy and West 
Valley is the minority position in Utah, and is limited to those three courts. 
Judge Fratto's position as to the requirement that Checkrite show 
compelling reasons for him to go against the policy30 is a reversal of the standard of 
statutory enforcement. Checkrite's position is that the Court duty is to defend the 
statute as written, not the reverse. 
29
 See the copy of the default judgment from the District Court in 
Washington County attached to the addendum. 
30
 Hearing Transcript, page 5, lines 13-18. 
21 
CONCLUSION 
The Court should eliminate the confusion between the District Courts and 
hold that "all costs of collection" as addressed by the statute and as already defined 
in the Utah Courts by Thoren v. Sandy City is meant to include "all costs of 
collection." 
The memorandum issued by the 3rd District Court Judges was erroneous, 
contrary to the form and intent of the statute, and unconstitutional. The meaning of 
the statute is clear and unambiguous, and the portion in controversy should be 
interpreted consistent with the preceding portions of the statute. 
Appellant's position is that the language of the prior sections of the statute are 
plain and unambiguous, and when read in light of those sections, the section in 
controversy is equally plain and unambiguous, and should be read to include all 
costs of collection. 
22 
Respectfully Submitted: 
Michael B. Bennett 
Richard H. DeLoney 
C. Douglas McCallon 
Attorneys for Appellant Checkrite Recovery Services, Inc. 
23 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that I did serve a copy of the Appellant's Brief upon 
Defendant/Appellee Deborah M. King by mailing a full and complete copy thereof 
to: 
Evan S. Strassberg 
Van Cott, Bagley, Cornwall & McCarthy 
50 So. Main Street, Suite 1600 
P.O. Box 45340 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-45340 
on this 4th day of June, 2001. 
Richard H. DeLoneyy 
Counsel for Petitioner/Appellant Checkrite Recovery Services 
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ADDENDUM 
EXHIBIT ONE 
&z&wf&& 
Wbvto JBfetrict Court 
M E M O R A N D U M 
To: Interested Parties 
From: Judge Ann Boyden 
Judge Michael KL Burton 
Judge Matthew B. Dunant 
Judge Joseph Q Fiatto, Jr. 
Judge Denise P. Iindberg 
Judge Paul G. Maughn 
Date: January 10, 2000 
Re: Policy For Default Judgment Awards for Dishonored Checks 
For the purpose of determining awards for default judgments when a civil action is 
brought pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 7-15-1 (dishonored checks), the following policy will apply 
at the West Valley, Murray, and Sandy Departments of the Third District Court 
AWAJtD: \ C-O \J 
the check amount; r V ^ ~^ 0" 
interest; , — \ Q^ 
s 
court costs; A ' •>? v \ ^ - A £ 
attorneys' fees; s ^ w ^ x / 0 ^ 
damages equal to the greater of $100 per case or 
triple the amount of the checks in the case - not to exceed the total of the checks plus $500 
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EXHIBIT TWO 
LAW OFFICES OF BENNETT & DELONEY, P C 
MICHAEL B. BENNETT, #6488 
RICHARD H. DELONEY, #5601 
DOUG McCALLON, #8121 
1265 E. FORT UNION BLVD , SUITE 111 
MIDVALE, UT 84047 
Telephone: (801) 963-9993 
ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, MURRAY DEPARTMENT 
CHECKRITE RECOVERY SERVICES, INC , ] 
Plaintiff, ] 
vs. 
DEBORAH M. KING 
1191BELSAWCIR. 
SANDY, UT. 84094 
Defendant. 
DEFAULT JUDGMENT 
Civil No 000204229 
Judge: BURTON 
The Plaintiff having filed his cause of action, the Clerk having entered the default of the above Defendant, 
and upon presentation of evidence of the amounts due Plaintiff, it is hereby: 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED AS FOLLOWS: 
1. Judgment is entered in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendant as follows: 
The principal amount: $ 245.04 
Costs of court: $ 76.00 
Interest at the rate of 7.670% per annum on 
the unpaid balance from date of judgment 
Damages equal to the greater of $100.00 or 
triple the check amount, not to exceed the 
check amount by more than $500.00: $ 735.12 
VJZ^ 
A reasonable attorney's fee pursuant to 
Rule 4-505-1 of the Utah Code of Judicial 
Administration $ 150.00 , / / / y ^ 
The total amount of the judgment: 
2. It is further ordered that this judgment shall be augmented in the amount of reasonable costs and 
attorneys fees expended in collecting said judgment by execution orotherv^e^lhall ^established by affidavit. 
Dated this 7 daY o f - ^ 2000. 
- . , . -7 £C, 
. t/'J / 
District Court Judge 
STAk* liSHD AT DlRECTiON OF JUDGE 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT MURRAY COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CHECKRITE RECOVERY SERVICES, 
Plaintiff, 
vs . 
THERESA V PALELEI, 
Defendant 
/ 
NOTICE OF 
HRG. ON COLLECTION COST 
Case No: 000204232 DC 
Judge 
Date : 
JOSEPH C. FRATTO 
November 16,2 000 
P* X 
ON COLLECTIOIKCOST i s s c h e d u l e d . 
D a t e : 11/Z3^2000 
Time: O^fOO p.m. 
Location: Room 102 
MURRAY DISTRICT COURT 
5022 SOUTH STATE STREET 
MURRAY, UT 84107 
ore Judae: JOSEPH C. FRATTO 
/ ~ ) 
fef 
Dated this ) (4? day of 
District Court Deputy Clerk 
'iolitdVun^ before ncV (A\o^Mt oi\ ot^eks 
i*> c V\VetA (A\^ <T 0 V C\°\ . " 
Page 1 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT MURRAY COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CHECKRITE RECOVERY, 
Plaintiff, 
DEFAULT REJECTION NOTICE 
vs . Case No: 000204229 DC 
DEBORAH M KING, 
Defendant 
Judge: MICHAEL K. BURTON 
Date: August 10,2000 
We are unable to enter the default judgment/certificate in this 
case for tJaer~CoTIcmihg reasons: 
Notp^: "Collection costs"/hot allowable on checks written after 
MAY,( 1999. 
Dated this / & day of {^-t<U_, 
Pa^e n 'la^t) 
EXHIBIT THREE 
LAW OFFICES OF BENNETT & DELONEY, P.C. 
DOUG MCCALLON, #8121 
2964 West 4700 South, Suite #222 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84118-2559 
Telephone: (801) 963-9993 
Facsimile: (801) 963-9955 
ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, MURRAY DEPARTMENT 
CHECKRITE RECOVERY SERVICES, INC. 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DEBORAH M KING 
1191BELSAWCIR. ] 
SANDY, UTAH 84094 ] 
Defendant. ] 
) COMPLAINT 
i Civil No. 
Judge: 
Plaintiff, CheckRite Recovery Services, Inc., by and through its attorney of record, Doug McCallon, 
ESQ. complains of DEBORAH M. KING, Defendant. Plaintiff would show this Honorable Court as follows: 
I. 
PARTIES 
1. Plaintiff, CheckRite Recovery Services, Inc., is a corporation duly organized and existing under 
the laws of the State of Utah. Plaintiff, in its regular course of business, has been assigned the right to collect 
monies owing to Hair Styles Inn; McDonalds; Astro Burger; Utah Idaho Supply, and Mac's Craft & Hobby 
("Merchants") which forms the basis of this lawsuit. 
2. Defendant, DEBORAH M. KING is an individual who resides or is amenable to service in Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah. 
1766285/mrr 
f-.?> r 
I. 
JURISDICTION 
3. Merchant owns a business located in Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
4. Defendant is a resident of Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
5. The causes of action which are the basis for this lawsuit occurred in Salt Lake County, State 
of Utah. 
6. The amount claimed is less than twenty thousand dollars ($20,000.00), exclusive of costs. 
III. 
N O T I C E 
ACTUAL AND STATUTORY 
7. On or about October 27,1999; November 24,1999; October 27,1999, October 28,1999, 
December 20,1999; December 27, 1999; October 25,1999; December 29,1999, and December 20, 1999, 
respectively, Plaintiff CheckRite Recovery Services, Inc, made written demand for payment of check(s) #0232, 
0286, 0244, 0250, 0294, 0297, 0217, 0147, and 0290 in the amount(s) of $101 27; $9.07; $12.56; $10 03, 
$7.34; $i 1.16; $20.03; $65.83, and $7.70, respectively, upon Defendant, pursuant to Sections 7-15-1 and 7-
15-2, Utah Code Annotated, via United StatesPostal Service, postage pre-paid, and addressed to Defendant's 
last known address. As of this date, thirty days have passed and Defendant has failed and refused to pay 
Plaintiff all amounts owed. 
8. On or about November 15,1999; December 14,1999; November 15,1999, January 6,2000, 
January 12, 2000; November 11, 1999; January 17, 2000, and January 6, 2000, respectively, Plaintiff 
CheckRite Recovery Services, Inc. made a second written demand for payment of checks #0232,0286,0244, 
0250,0294,0297,0217,0147, and 0290, in the amounts of $101.27; $9.07; $12.56; $10.03; $7.34; $11.16, 
$20.09; $65.83, and $7.70, respectively, upon Defendant, also pursuant to Sections 7-15-1 and 7-15-2, Utah 
Code Annotated, via United States Postal Service, postage pre-paid, and addressed to Defendant's last known 
1766285/mrr 
address. As of this date, thirty days have passed and Defendant has failed and refused to pay Plaintiff all 
amounts owed. 
IV. 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
DISHONORED CHECKS 
9. On or about the dates set forth below, Defendant willingly, knowingly, and intentionally 
caused to be issued the following checks, in the following amount, payable to the following Merchant and 
signed by Defendant: 
CHECK DATES CHECK NO. MERCHANT AMOUNT 
10-11-99 
11-8-99 
10-14-00 
10-17-00 
12-6-00 
12-10-99 
10-08-99 
12-11-99 
11-30-99 
0232 
0286 
0244 
0250 
0294 
0297 
0217 
0147 
0290 
Hairstyles Inn. 
McDonalds 
Astro Burger 
McDonalds 
McDonalds 
McDonalds 
Utah Idaho Supply 
Mac's Craft & Hobby 
Astro Burger 
$101.27 
$9.07 
$12.56 
$10.03 
$7.34 
$11.16 
$20.09 
$65.82 
$7.70 
A copy of the dishonored checks are attached hereto and incorporated as part of this complaint as Exhibit "A". 
10. Said checks were returned uncollected to Merchant for the following reason: 
INSUFFICIENT FUNDS." Subsequently, these checks were assigned to Plaintiff, and CheckRite Recovery 
Services, Inc. is the current holder in due course of the checks. 
11. Plaintiff has on two different occasions demanded payment from Defendant for the 
dishonored checks, pursuant to Section 7-15-1, Utah Code Annotated, but Defendant has failed to make 
payment on the same. 
12. Defendant has failed to make payment of the checks or drafts within thirty days after 
receiving notice of its dishonor given by CheckRite Recovery Services, Inc. 
13. At the time Defendant caused the checks to be issued, Defendant knew or should have 
known that the checks would not be honored by the financial institution shown on the checks. 
1766285/mrr 
/ V fp 
14. Pursuant to Section 7-15-1, Utah Code Annotated, Plaintiff is entitled to, in addition to the 
face amount of the checks, interest, costs of collection, court costs, process of service fees, and a reasonable 
attorney's fee. 
V. 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION 
15. Plaintiff hereby realleges and incorporates by reference paragraphs 1 through 14 
hereinabove and further states: 
16. The representation made to the Merchant by Defendant that the checks would be paid upon 
presentment was false. 
17. Plaintiff unknowingly and in ignorance of the falsity of the representation, was induced to 
act upon the Defendant's representation, and did in fact rely on this representation to its detriment. 
18. Had the Merchant known of the falsity of the representation, it would have never dealt or 
negotiated with Defendant for payment of the merchandise by checks, and would have never accepted 
Defendant's checks. 
19. As a result of the negligent misrepresentation by the Defendant, Plaintiff has been damaged 
in an amount to be determined at trial, plus interest thereon at the maximum legal rate, plus reasonable 
attorney fees and costs. 
VI. 
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION 
FRAUD 
20. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates herein by reference paragraphs 1 through 19 and further 
states: 
21. Defendant willingly, knowingly and intentionally devised a scheme to commit fraud against 
Plaintiff in violation of Sections 76-6-517 and 76-10-1801, Utah Code Annotated, as follows: 
1766285/mn- C<( 
22 Oa or about October 11, 1999, November 8, 1999, October 14, 1999, October 17, lgggt 
December 6, 1999, December 10, 1999, October 8, 1933; December 11, 1999, and November 30, I999 
respectively, Defendant knowingly, willingly, and intentionally communicated to Merchant that Defendant Would 
immediately pay Merchant in cash equivalent the full amounts due for merchandise. Merchant in good faith 
relied upon Defendant's intentional misrepresentation of material fact which has resulted in damage to Plaintiff 
As of this date Defendant has possession and control over the merchandise, without having paid Plaintiff 
VII. 
FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
CONVERSION 
23. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates herein by reference paragraphs 1 through 22 and further 
states 
24 On or about October 11, 1999, November 8,1999, October 14, 1999, October 17, 1999, 
December 6, 1999; December 10, 1999, October 8,1999; December 11, 1999, and November 30, 19gg, 
respectively, Defendant unlawfully Converted to her own use, the goods, valued at $245 04, respectively, ;he 
property of Merchant. 
VIII. 
FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
GOODS SOLD AND DELIVERED 
25. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates herein by reference paragraphs 1 through 24 and further 
states-
26. Defendant owes Plaintiff $245.04, respectively, for goods sold and delivered to Defendant 
on or about October 11,1999, November 8,1999; October 14,1999; October 17,1999; December 6,1999, 
December 10,1999; October 8,199g; December 11,1999, and November 30,1999, respectively 
)X 
NON-MILITARY CERTIFICATION 
27. Plaintiff believes that Defendant is not a member of the Armed Forces of the United States 
l7(>6285/mrT 
X. 
CONDITIONS PRECEDENT 
28. Plaintiff avers that proper written notice, demand and all other conditions precedent to 
maintaining this action have been fulfilled by Plaintiff. 
XI. 
ATTORNEY FEES 
29. Plaintiff is entitled to recover reasonable attorney fees as provided for in Rule 4-505.01 of 
the Utah Code ofJudicial Administration, and Section 7-15-1 ofthe Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended. 
XI!. 
PRAYER 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment against Defendant pursuant to Section 7-15-1, Utah 
Code Annotated as follows. 
1 The principal amount of the checks, in the sum of $245 04, respectively; 
2. Interest at the rate of 7.670% per annum on the unpaid balance of its claim from the date 
of judgment, until paid; / 
3 Court costs in the amount of $37.00; 
4 Process of service fees, the amount to be determined; 
5. For attorney fees pursuant to Rule 4-505 and Rule 4-505-1 of the Utah Code of Judicial 
Administration if this matter is uncontested, or for Plaintiffs reasonable attorney fees if this 
matter is contested; 
6 Actual costs of collection of $20.08 per check for a total amount of $180.72; and 
7. Damages in the total amount of $735.12, which is equal to the greater of $100.00 or triple 
the check amount, not exceed the check amount by more than $500.00. 
8. For any other relief as this Court deems just and equitable. 
DATED this rj day of May, 2000. 
>N. ESQ. v DOUG McCALLO ,  
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF 
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LAW OFFICES OF BENNETT & DELONEY, P.C. 
DOUG MCCALLON, #8121 
2964 West 4700 South, Suite #222 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84118-2559 
Telephone: (801) 963-9993 
Facsimile: (801) 963-9955 
ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, MURRAY DEPARTMENT 
CHECKRITE RECOVERY SERVICES, 
INC., 
Plaintiff. 
vs. 
DEBORAH M. KING 
1191 BELSAWCIR. 
SANDY, UTAH 84094 
Defendant. 
20 DAY SUMMONS 
THE STATE OF UTAH TO THE ABOVE NAMED DEFENDANT(S): 
YOU ARE HEREBY SUMMONED and required to file an answer in writing to the attached Complaint with 
the Clerk of the above entitled Court at 5022 South State Street, Murray, Utah 84107, and to serve upon or mail 
to Doug McCallon, Esq., Plaintiffs attorney, at 2964 West 4700 South, Suite 222, Salt Lake City, UT 84118, a copy 
of said answer within twenty (20) days after service of this Summons upon you. 
If you fail to do so, judgment by default will be taken against you for the relief demanded in said Complaint, 
which will be filed with the Clerk of said Court within 10 days of service of this Summons upon you. A copy of said 
Complaint is hereto annexed and herewith served upon you. 
Dated this ]/\ day of May, 2000. 
DOUG McCALLON, ESQ. 
') / Q 
(3^P i ; 
)lf>f>lRsf„ 
LAW OFFICES OF BENNETT & DELONEY, P.C. 
MICHAEL B. BENNETT, #6488 
RICHARD H. DELONEY #5601 
DOUGLAS McCALLON, #8121 
1265 E. FORT UNION BLVD., SUITE 111 
MIDVALE, UT 84047 
Telephone: (801) 963-9993 
Fax: (801) 963-9955 
ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, MURRAY DEPARTMENT 
CHECKRITE RECOVERY SERVICES, 
INC 
Plaintiff 
DEBORAH M. KING, ; 
Defendant. ] 
) PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO 
) RECONSIDER ENTRY OF ITS 
) DEFAULT JUDGMENT/CERTIFICATE 
I Civil No.: 000204229 
I Judge: Michael K. Burton 
Plaintiff, CheckRite Recovery Services, Inc., through it's attorney, Doug 
McCallon, Esq., hereby moves this Court to reconsider entry of its default 
judgment/certificate in the above matter pursuant to §7-15-1 (7)(b)(iii), U.C.A., in the above 
matter. 
DATED this ( / / d a y of October, 2000. 
DOUG McCALLON, ESQ. 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Pace Ad 
In The Third Judicial District Court Of Salt Lake County 
Murray Department, State of Utah 
CHECKRITE RECOVERY SERVICES 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
THERESA V. PALELEI 
and 
DEBORAH M. KING 
Defendant 
NOTICE OF DECISION 
JUDGE J . C FRATTO 
Case No. 000204232 
and 
000204229 
RE: COLLECTION COSTS ON RETURNED CHECKS 
Having been submitted for decision without oral argument pursuant to rule 4-501, Rules of 
Practice, and the court being now fully advised in the premises: 
Judge Fratto can see no compelling reason to change the policy regarding the collection costs on 
returned checks. 
Dated: December 5, 2000 
Ellen Shaw, Deputy Clerk 
I certify that I hand delivered a copy of this notice on December 5, 2000 to the following: 
DOUG McCALLON, A n y . for Pltf. 
1 265 E. Fort Union Blvd., Suite 1 1 1 
Midvale, UT 84047 
fi&e 76 
ATTACHMENT "I 
#T^ A.V 
Bennett & DeLoney, P.C. 
Doug McCallon, 
Utah Bar #8121 
Texas Bar #13355000 
1265 East Ft. Union Blvd., #11 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
(888)832-0240 
(801)963-9955(fax) 
> ^ ' I Ml-2 PHI?: 
,
 JD D I ' J F K I C I C0U \ l 
r tUr ^ A V DEFT 
Attorney(s) for Defendant 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, MURRAY DEPARTMENT 
CHECKRITE RECOVERY SERVICES 
Appellant, 
vs. 
DEBORAH M. KING 
Appellee. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Trial Court No. 000204229 
Notice is hereby given that CHECKRITE RECOVERY SERVICES, a Utah 
Corporation, appeals to the Supreme Court of Utah an Order of the Honorable Joseph Fratto, Jr. 
entered in this matter on December 5, 2000. 
The appeal is taken from the NOTICE OF DECISION, whereby collection costs on return 
checks are being denied on all check cases filed after May 4, 1999 pursuant to a Memorandum 
issued in the Third District Court.. 
P 
Callprf, E< 
rts-^ 
Doug Mc o*£ sq. 
Law Offices of Bennett & DeLoney, P C 
Attorneys for Appellant 
[49* 5¥ 
Certificate of Service f / 
( day of w X ^ ' I, Doug McCallon, certify that on the f  \ / ^ ~ ~ , 20<y i served a 
copy of the attached Notice of Appeal in this matter by mailing it to the below named counsel for 
Appellee by first class mail with sufficient postage prepaid to the following: 
DEBORAH M. KING 
1191 Belsaw Circle 
Sandy, Utah 84094 
PKIW 
EXHIBIT FOUR 
Current Law 
Day Day 7 
(After Notice) (Current law is too fast and hard 
for the innocent mistake, 
too easy for the fraud.) 
Relumed 
Check 
$20.00 service fee 
$ 57.00 court costs 
$ I50.00 attorney fees 
$ 20.00 service fee (from day I) 
Total $ 227.00 + interest and check amount 
Swallow Law 
Day I Day 16 
(After Notice) 
Day 30 Day 31 
(After Notice) Offer to settle 
File suit 
Returned (Merchant may waive any $ 20.00 collection fee 
Check or all of this service fee.) $ 20.00 service fee (from day 1) 
$20.00 service fee Total $ 40.00 + check amount 
Swallow's law gives time for the innocent consumer to clear up a mistake, but 
is hard on the fraudulent check writer. 
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P R O C E E D I N G 
THE COURT: I have two matters here, 
Checkrite v. Palelie and King. And they were put on 
the calendar--I was looking at these files yesterday 
(inaudible), if you would, over the proposed judgment. 
I note that the way this apparently 
logistically was done was you were sent a notice that 
the clerk had rejected your Certificate of Default on 
the basis that the proposed judgment was--did not seem 
to conform with what had been our directive. And I 
think probably the correct procedure was this: If the 
other party is in default, then the clerk enters the 
default and we assess your proposed judgment, which I 
would have some questions about. 
Apparently the main question in these 
judgments is you ask for--
MR. McCALLON: (Inaudible.) 
THE COURT: We have the principal amount, 
which are the checks, the face amount of the checks. 
We have the costs of court, and then we have damages 
and then we have collection costs, attorney's fees. 
And apparently what the clerk was looking at in terms 
of rejecting this was this directive of January 10, 
1 2000: 
T\TlT>r\\M\ V l>T7T>ni>TTXTri TKW f%h 1 \ 10C-1 1 B« 
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_For the purpose of determining awards of 
It judgments when a civil action is brought 
pursuant to Title 7, Chapter 15, Section 1,__ which is 
dishonored checks, __the following policy will apply at 
the West Valley, Murray and Sandy Departments of the 
Third 
costs 
District Court. 
__Award. The check amount, interest, court 
, attorney fees and damages equal to the greater 
of $100 per case or triple the amount of the checks in 
the case, not to exceed the total of the checks plus 
$500. 
I don 
were i 
to go 
thing 
And I think our situation is this, although 
't doubt I have the ability, if you will, if 1 
to be convinced that if this policy was in error, 
ahead and do what I think to be the correct 
to do. However, I want to give as much 
deference as possible to the policy. 
haven 
this-
some < 
court 
in a < 
some < 
The history of this, as I understand it--I 
't been intimately involved with the history of 
-the history seems to be this: That there was 
considerable differences between the various 
sites on how to handle these dishonored checks 
iefault setting. And Salt Lake, if you will--or 
of the judges in Salt Lake were taking a position i 
1 and Murray was taking a position and Sandy was taking | 
jyuuu-ra&c 
a position, and everyone 
position. 
And there had 
Page 5 
was taking a different 
been some considerable 
discussion and the determination to be that a 
committee should be formed, or some sort of group to \ 
sort of look at this and 
determination, if you wi 
interim policy, that we 
make some--a final 
11. But in any event, as an 
try to be uniform in handling 
these matters. And consequently this memorandum of 
the 10th of January. 
Now, whether any committee has been formed 
or whether there is--if 
further, I don't know. 
say, unless you have a c 
policy is just totally — 
policy, then I'll — I'll 
expect that your default 
it. 
MR. McCALLON: 
We'd like to have a copy 
THE COURT: Of 
MR. McCALLON: 
fair as far as it goes, 
important element under 
1 statute's 7-15-1(7)(a) ( 
anyone else is looking at this 
I don't know that. But as I 
ompelling argument why this 
that I should disregard the 
follow the policy and I would 
judgments would conform with 
Do you have a copy of that? 
of it. 
course. 
I think, Judge, the policy is 
but it leaves out one 
the statute. And that 
inaudible). 
'^*v«% i n n -i i o o 
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THE COURT: Could we get that in front of me 
before we go further? 
MR. McCALLON: I've got it here, Judge. May 
I approach? (Inaudible.) I've got it underlined 
right there. (Inaudible) also I meant to add, for 
some reason, in the cost memorandum costs--collection 
costs. 
THE COURT: Well, and as I say, the 
discussion we've had is this, apparently: What is 
meant by __costs of collection^ when the thing finally 
goes to a lawsuit and, in the end, a default? 
MR. McCALLON: Now, if I was a judge, you 
look at that (inaudible). The attorney doesn't get 
any of that. We get none of that. Actually, 
Checkrite, who is kind of like an insurer, (inaudible) 
carrier--
THE COURT: Right. 
MR. McCALLON: --guaranteeing the retail 
establishment (inaudible) check. The retail 
establishment gets all the money. All these damages 
and everything, they go actually to the retailer, not 
to me, as an attorney--or my firm (inaudible). In 
fact, all those damages, everything (inaudible) 
attorney's fees goes to the actual client, rather than 
to Checkrite or us. It's the cost of Checkrite 
n U D H A i T A V ! > T 7 B m i T T \ T n ^T-r-* 
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(inaudible) and Mr. (inaudible) can explain that to 
you, as far as the amount that they incur per check. 
And that's what I'm looking at. 
less 
THE COURT: Now, have you asked for more or 
a standard amount, costs of collection, __X__ 
number of dollars? 
MR. McCALLON: Just on Checkrite. 
(Inaudible) we've asked them to actually--(inaudible). 
THE COURT: Mr. (inaudible)? 
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Just if we can back 
up for a second. The old--in the old statute, before 
this new one was enacted, in a civil action the 
service charge of $20 was available. And they've done 
away with that in this statute in a civil action and 
included costs of collection. And, of course, as Mr. 
McCallon said, the damages can't go to an agent. They 
have 
have 
Judg* 
--the damages of not less than a hundred dollars 
to go to the merchant. 
So Checkrite's only--the process is this, 
B. Checkrite works these cases from an office in 
Colorado, these particular ones. They send letters--
it' s a standardized, computerized process of sending 
two or three dunning letters, making X amount of 
phone calls, and then as a last resort they earmark 
1 some of these for suit. 
nppniuAYi?FPni?TTisjr} njr fR()m?R-\iRR 
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This standardized process costs them money 
ey know exactly how much each one costs. And 
it's the same for each one, because they go through 
the same process. And they've determined that it 
costs $20.08 for each one. That's their cost. 
Ironically, that's almost the same as the old $20 
service charge under the old statute. And that's 
where 
Checkr 
statut 
you'11 
that goes. It's not to us but directly back to 
ite to reimburse them for their costs. 
THE COURT: Well, as I say, I--
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Under the old 
e, costs of collection were provided for. If 
remember, those costs weren't only--were 
designed to reimburse someone who went to small claims 
court, not for a collection agency. But they did have 
the service charge in there. 
under 
policy 
and a 
unify, 
interp 
And I 
Murray 
THE COURT: I think the thinking here now is 
the statute--and as I say, this is an interim 
The thing needs to be looked at more closely 
final determination made in terms of trying to 
if you will, what turns out to be varied 
retations. And, indeed, your interpretation. 
think, quite frankly, we were doing that in 
here. And then as a consensus, if you will, a 
decision made to--on a temporary basis, to be unified | 
Multi-Fage* l 
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under this policy. 
But I'm not arguing the case, but I think 
the other side of that was that in the damages--I 
mean, aside from who gets money and who doesn't 
(inaudible) proper consideration-- that the costs of 
collection--it says _including court costs and 
reasonable attorney's fees._ And whether that's 
really limited to that--unless you can show 
specifically some other costs of collection, possibly 
by affidavit. 
MR. McCALLON: We could do that. 
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: We could do that. 
MR. McCALLON: Judge, I would point out--and 
this is where the $20 (inaudible) comes in--Checkrite 
will make, as an insurance company (inaudible) 
situation--they don't get any money for doing t h i s — 
for collection this check for the retailer unless they 
get this cost of collection. That's all they get. 
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: In fact, they--and 
this is-- on these that they sue, it's only their 
costs of collection. There's no profit involved, it's 
just--it just brings them back to even. 
THE COURT: Well, I'm (inaudible). Like I 
say, I'm not--it's been, really, almost a year, since 
January, I think is when we were--January or December 
Muiti-rage 
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of last year--or last year--December and January of 
this year when these discussions were taking place. 
Let me look into it again--
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Sure. 
THE COURT: --and see where we are. I'm 
going to at least have the default entered, if you 
cam. And 
the clerk 
filed and 
I imagine you can, and of course we'll have 
check the--make sure there's been no answer 
get that in order so that these are actually 
in default mode because--apparently they are, but no 
default certificate has been signed yet. 
you know. 
Let me look into it some more and I'll let 
MR. McCALLON: In the meantime do you want 
us to give you an affidavit as to (inaudible)? 
THE COURT: Well, I think at this point 
(inaudible) let me make a final decision on this and 
then you can conform your (inaudible). 
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Just from being in 
the industry for a while, my guess would be there's 
been some abuses with collection costs of some big 
numbers like, you know, $40, $50, $60 that have raised 
some eyebrows that are padded. And definitely those 
| should be 
[ Checkrite 
stopped. Certainly not so in the case of 
They've done a mathematical calculation of | 
Multi-Page 
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their cost in each one. 
THE COURT: Let me give you back what you 
gave me, and also the copy of this--I think they have 
also at the counter a copy of the policy. 
MR. McCALLON: Thank you. (Inaudible.) 
THE COURT: Let you know. Thanks for coming 
in and discussing it. 
(Hearing concluded at this point.) 
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STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss . 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
I, RENEE STACY, a Certified Shorthand Reporter 
and Notary Public within and for the County of Salt 
Lake, State of Utah, do hereby certify: 
That the foregoing tape-recorded proceedings were 
transcribed into typewriting under my direction and 
supervision and that the foregoing pages contain a 
true and correct transcription of said proceedings to 
the best of my ability to do so. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto subscribed my 
name and affixed my seal this 27th day of February 
/ C ® ^ RENEELSTACY . ?iiO!UL'Cl* ^ t ^ y 
2242 East Summerwood Dr I (I 
i \»\ W^Ji) h* Le'/ton. Utah 840*0 , 
8 V ^ v ^ ' ^ v y / M y Commission Expires § — 
< N v - J > > y November 9,2003 
5 X ' ^ > / State of Utah _J _ _ 
^ ^ ^~~m. « ^ „ ^ - j RENEE STACY, CSR 
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LAW OFFICES OF BENNETT & DELONEY, P.C. 
MICHAEL B. BENNETT, #6488 
RICHARD H. DELONEY, #5601 
DOUG McCALLON, #8121 
1265 E. FORT UNION BLVD., SUITE 111 
MIDVALE, UT 84047 
Telephone: (801) 963-9993 
ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF 
FIFTH DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
WASHINGTON COUNTY, ST. GEORGE DEPARTMENT 
CHECKRITE RECOVERY SERVICES, INC., 
Plaintiff, ; 
vs. ] 
MAUREEN ANN LEFEVRE ; 
568 S. MAIN ST., #235 
CEDAR CITY, UT 84720 ; 
Defendant. 
i DEFAULT JUDGMENT 
Civil No: 000500789 
i Judge: G. Rand Beacham 
The Plaintiff having filed his cause of action, the Clerk having entered the default of the above Defendant, 
and upon presentation of evidence of the amounts due Plaintiff, it is hereby: 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED AS FOLLOWS: 
1. Judgment is entered in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendant as follows: 
The principal amount: $101.00 
Costs of court: $74.00 
Interest at the rate of 7.670% per annum on 
the unpaid balance from date of judgment 
Damages equal to the greater of $100.00 or 
triple the check amount, not to exceed the 
check amount by more than $500.00: $303.00 
Collections cost of $20.08 per check $20.08 
A reasonable attorney's fee pursuant to 
Rule 4-505-1 of the Utah Code of Judicial 
Administration $150.00 
The total amount of the judgment: $648.08 
2. It is further ordered that this judgment shall be augmented in the amount of reasonable costs and 
attorneys fees expended in collecting said judgment by execution or otherwise as shall be established by affidavit. 
Dated this/j£ day of November, 2000. 
District Court Judge 
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7-15-1. Definitions - Civil liability of issuer - Notice of action - Collection costs --
Exemptions. 
(1) As used in this chapter: 
(a) "Check" means a payment instrument on a depository institution including a: 
(i) check; 
(ii) draft; 
(iii) order; or 
(iv) other instrument. 
(b) "Issuer" means a person who makes, draws, signs, or issues a check, whether as corporate 
agent or otherwise, for the purpose of: 
(i) obtaining from any person any money, merchandise, property, or other thing of value; or 
(ii) paying for any service, wages, salary, or rent. 
(c) "Mailed" means the day that a notice is properly deposited in the United States mail. 
(2) (a) An issuer of a check is liable to the holder of the check if: 
(i) the check: 
(A) is not honored upon presentment; and 
(B) is marked "refer to maker"; 
(ii) the account upon which the check is made or drawn: 
(A) does not exist; 
(B) has been closed; or 
(C) does not have sufficient funds or sufficient credit for payment in full of the check; or 
(iii) (A) the check is issued in partial or complete fulfillment of a valid and legally binding 
obligation: and 
(B) the issuer stops payment on the check with the intent to: 
(I) fraudulently defeat a possessory lien; or 
(II) otherwise defraud the holder of the check. 
(b) If an issuer of a check is liable under Subsection (2)(a), the issuer is liable for: 
(i) the check amount; and 
(ii) a service charge of $20. 
(3) (a) The holder of a check that has been dishonored may: 
(i) give written or oral notice of dishonor to the issuer of the check; and 
(ii) waive all or part of the service charge imposed under Subsection (2)(b). 
(b) Notwithstanding Subsection (2)(b), a holder of a check that has been dishonored may not 
collect and the issuer is not liable for the service charge imposed under Subsection (2)(b) if: 
(i) the holder redeposits the check; and 
(ii) that check is honored. 
(4) If the issuer does not pay the amount owed under Subsection (2)(b) within 15 calendar days 
from the day on which the notice required under Subsection (5) is mailed, the issuer is liable for: 
(a) the amount owed under Subsection (2)(b); and 
(b) collection costs not to exceed $20. 
(5) (a) A holder shall provide written notice to an issuer before: 
(i) charging collection costs under Subsection (4) in addition to the amount owed under 
Subsection (2)(b); or 
(ii) filing an action based upon this section. 
(b) The written notice required under Subsection (5)(a) shall notify the issuer of the dishonored 
check that: 
(i) if the amount owed under Subsection (2)(b) is not paid within 15 calendar days from the day on 
which the notice is mailed, the issuer is liable for: 
(A) the amount owed under Subsection (2)(b); and 
(B) collection costs under Subsection (4); and 
(ii) the holder may file civil action if the issuer does not pay to the holder the amount owed under 
Subsection (4) within 30 calendar days from the day on which the notice is mailed. 
(6) (a) If the issuer has not paid the holder the amounts owed under Subsection (4) within 30 
calendar days from the day on which the notice required by Subsection (5) is mailed, the holder may 
offer to not file civil action under this section if the issuer pays the holder: 
(i) the amount owed under Subsection (2)(b); 
(ii) the collection costs under Subsection (4); 
(iii) an amount that: 
(A) is equal to the greater of: 
(I) $50: or 
(II) triple the check amount; and 
(B) does not exceed the check amount plus $250; and 
(iv) if the holder retains an attorney to recover on the dishonored check, reasonable attorney's fees 
not to exceed $50. 
(b) (i) Notwithstanding Subsection (6)(a), all amounts charged or collected under Subsection (6) 
(a)(iii) shall be paid to and be the property of the original payee of the check. 
(ii) A person who is not the original payee may not retain any amounts charged or collected under 
Subsection (6)(a)(iii). 
(iii) The original payee of a check may not contract for a person to retain any amounts charged or 
collected under Subsection (6)(a)(iii). 
(7) (a) A civil action may not be filed under this section unless the issuer fails to pay the amounts 
owed under Subsection (4) within 30 calendar days from the day on which the notice required by 
Subsection (5) is mailed. 
(b) In a civil action, the issuer of the check is liable to the holder for: 
(i) the check amount; 
(ii) interest; 
(iii) all costs of collection, including all court costs and reasonable attorneys' fees; and 
(iv) damages: 
(A) equal to the greater of: 
(I) $100; or 
(II) triple the check amount; and 
(B) not to exceed the check amount plus $500. 
(c) If an issuer is held liable under Subsection (7)(b), notwithstanding Subsection (7)(b), a court 
may waive all or part of the amounts owed under Subsections (7)(b)(ii) through (iv) upon a finding of 
good cause. 
(d) (i) Notwithstanding Subsection (7)(b), all amounts charged or collected under Subsection (7) 
(b)(iv) shall be paid to and be the property of the original payee of the check. 
(ii) A person who is not the original payee may not retain any amounts charged or 
collected under Subsection (7)(b)(iv). 
(iii) The original payee of a check may not contract for a person to retain any amounts charged or 
collected under Subsection (7)(b)(iv). 
(8) This section may not be construed to prohibit the holder of the check from seeking relief under 
any other applicable statute or cause of action. 
(9) (a) Notwithstanding the other provisions of this section, a holder of a check is exempt from 
this section if: 
(i) the holder: 
(A) is a depository institution; or 
(B) a person that receives a payment on behalf of a depository institution; 
(ii) the check is a payment on a loan that originated at the depository institution that: 
(A) is the holder: or 
(B) on behalf of which the holder received the payment; and 
(iii) the loan contract states a specific service charge for dishonor. 
(b) A holder exempt under Subsection (9)(a) may contract with an issuer for the collection of fees 
or charges for the dishonor of a check. 
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